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Military studies are superficially an accessible subject within ancient histo-
ry. Lecturers find their classes filled with young men fascinated by warfare, hav-
ing learnt from mass media of Thermopylai or Alexander. More academically, 
historians catalogue innovations to create tactical studies. Yet the history of 
Greek warfare is not primarily exploration of technology. Innovation arose from 
the socio-political matrix and became meaningful in politics when activated by 
institutional evolution. In naval warfare, mere technological progress seldom 
motivated the emergence of hegemonic strategy. Our prime exhibit will be the 
trieres ‘trireme’
1
, the three-banked warship and standard unit of classical navies.  
We explore the context of naval warfare, interweaving three themes: vessel 
procurement, manning, and deployment, instrumentalities by which combat in-
teracted with other dimensions of polis life. Here a distinction in archaic society 
between categories of maritime poleis becomes significant. In one group are 
Corinth, Chalcis, Eretria, and Miletos (to a degree): states typified by location at 
intersections of routes; early colonization; and trade intermediated by other 
communities
2
. In another are Aigina, Phokaia, and Samos, states characterized 
by placement flanking routes; later and reduced colonization; piracy; and less 
intermediated commerce.  
Consider the trireme’s introduction. Thucydides places this at Corinth ca. 
700, noting the work of the Corinthian shipwright Ameinokles at Samos (I 13, 2-
3), but continues that triremes were not numerous until later, somewhat before 
the Persian Wars and death of Dareios (I 14, 1-3; cfr. 18.2). This account has in-
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vited correction or rejection
3
. Such arguments ought not to inspire credibility
4
. 
For example, postulating a lost reference to biremes here offers no solution
5
. To 
warrant mention, this must be a two-banked warship larger than a pentekontor
6
, 
a vessel poorly attested (excepting perhaps Hom. Il. II 509-510; Thuc. I 10, 4)
7
. 
Its complexity and complement would place its affinities with the trireme, mak-
ing the mystery of the trireme’s late maturation the enigma of the bireme. And 
the Greek trireme force of Pharaoh Necho (ca. 600) would become inexplicable 
(Hdt. II 159, 1; cfr. 158, 1)
8
, One must explain the lag in the trireme’s predomi-
nance, because the plain sense of Thucydides requires that Ameinokles con-
structed triremes. In the process, we shall note other, albeit later, attestations of 
early triremes. 
An early Attic tradition attempted to account for this gap. Kleidemos (ca. 
350), the Atthidographer, tantalizingly linked the trireme with the mythology of 
Theseus
9
. Unfortunately, Plutarch’s text appears questionable at a crucial point. 
The received text: ἰδίως δέ πως καὶ περιττῶς ὁ Κλείδηµος ἀπήγγειλε περὶ 
τούτων, ἄνωθέν ποθεν ἀρξάµενος· ὅτι δόγµα κοινὸν ἦν Ἑλλήνων, µηδεµίαν 
ἐκπλεῖν τριήρη µηδαµόθεν ἀνδρῶν † πέντε πλείονας δεχοµένην … (obeliskos 
after Jacoby). As this stands, a prohibition barred triremes from ‘receiving’ more 
than five men, i.e., five epibatai. That would exclude expeditionary, amphibious 
warfare where squadrons attempted to dominate other poleis through embarked 
infantry. This koinon dogma parallels the Amphictyonic Oath (Aesch. II 115), 
proscribing certain siege tactics, or the Euboian convention during the Lelantine 
War prohibiting missile weapons
10
. Unfortunately, the next sentence is also 
problematic, contrasting Jason’s suppression of λῃστήρια with the koinon dog-
ma: τὸν δὲ ἄρχοντα τῆς Ἀργοῦς Ἰάσονα µόνον περιπλεῖν, ἐξείργοντα τῆς 
θαλάσσης τὰ λῃστήρια. Editors postulate a lacuna after περιπλεῖν; Lindskog 
offered πλείοσιν. A Bodleian manuscript (Barocc. 226) has … τριήρει πλήρει 
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ἀνδρῶν ἱκανῶν …, apparently a gloss that entered the text to provide contrast 
to the previous clause by asserting that Jason used a fuller ship’s complement. 
Next, Minos clearly acted παρὰ τὰ δόγματα by pursuing Daidalos, a fugitive to 
Athens, μακραῖς ναυσὶ. After Minos was blown off course and perished, The-
seus began building ships. When Deukalion, son of Minos, threatened Athenian 
hostages, Theseus attacked Knossos successfully. Nonetheless, distortion may 
run deeper. This tradition may have imagined an agreement forbidding forces 
larger than five triremes (a typical colonial expedition?). That proviso would 
provide the logical counterpoint to the actions of Jason, Minos, and Theseus. 
Kleidemos rationalizes the Minotaur story. He confutes the Thucydidean 
tradition of Minos as first thalassocrat (I, 4), also referenced by Herodotus (III 
122, 2). Minos is briefly a thalassocrat only through defiance of international 
agreement; his attack on Attica miscarries. Thucydidean tradition on Minos as 
the first who suppressed leisteia is rejected; Jason is portrayed in that role. 
Kleidemos visualizes Athens as a potential thalassocrat, but in a manner funda-
mentally defensive and panhellenic. 
This tradition was influenced by classical Attic naval predominance, a per-
spective also misleading modern analysts. We return, however, from classical 
fancies to archaic realities. One circumstance shaping deployment should be 
raised. Usage of equivalent groups of triremes and pentekontors in the same bat-
tle line is not attested. When pentekontors appear in the mainly trireme fleets of 
480, they comprise a small polis contingent. Because only propulsion by oars 
was used in battle, pentekontors could not hold station in an advancing line 
without affecting efficiency
11
. Triremes could, alongside pentekontors, under-
take single ship confrontations
12
, but would lose any advantages of a massed 
squadron. The Themistoclean naval program confirms this, preferring to over-
build with less adequate manning rather than create a mixed force better fitting 
manpower resources
13
. The suggestion that Athens and Aigina once deployed 
mixed fleets is without a single attestation
14
. No evidence reports a victory by 
pentakontors over triremes. 
Triremes infiltrated the force structure gradually. One role was conspicuous 
display for religious or secular purposes. Circa 600, Athens supposedly sent a 
trireme to Aigina demanding the statues of the goddesses Damia and Auxesia, 
stolen from Epidauros (Hdt. V 85, 1). Theoric ships were triremes, at Athens 
 
11
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subsidized from the naukraric treasury (Androt. FGrHist 324 F 36)
15
. The Myti-
lenaean ship bearing to Memphis Kambyses’ invitation to surrender was a tri-
reme (Hdt. III 13, 1; 14, 5-6). As elites provided ships to archaic governments, 
triremes gradually infiltrated navies, as aristocratic affluence grew and exhibi-
tionism became a motivating factor
16
. The instances where wealthy men provid-
ed triremes in the fifth century are a vestige of this phenomenon, stronger earlier 
when poleis possessed a more limited ability for directly exploiting elite re-
sources
17
. Early naval organization was conditioned by the interventions of ty-
rants, who in the supersession of aristocratic regimes emerged as proponents of 
populism and more integrated administrative apparatuses. Unsurprisingly, there-
fore, the personal ships of the tyrants of the Chersonese (VI 41, 1-2, cfr. 39, 1), 
as presumably those of their patrons, the Peisistratids, were triremes.  
The disparity in oarsmen of the pentekontor and trireme is striking (50 ver-
sus 170). Literary sources are mute on possible intermediates, and relatively ret-
icent on sub-categories
18
. More differentia exist for late Medieval/early modern 
navies
19
. Ancient testimonia differ from the iconography, leading scholars to de-
velop nuanced classifications
20
. Regardless of archaic terminological distinc-
tions, any sub-classes fell into desuetude for classical sources, leaving two basic 
types, pentekontor and trireme, to be distinguished in pertinent use and basis 
within logistics and force structure. Cost/benefit calculations in sustaining dif-
ferent size crews militated for the two classes, vessels with around fifty rowers 
(either monokrotos or dikrotos), and those with 170. These could only be three-
banked without wasting the additional manpower. Mobilizing 200 men
21
 per 
unit created an administrative threshold before large trireme fleets became feasi-
ble. 
These two classes reside in different spheres of Mediterranean sea fighting: 
leisteia ‘brigandage’, the ‘small war’, and fleet confrontation in battle lines
22
. By 
the Peloponnesian War, raiding took two forms: devastation by flotillas, some-
times accompanied by sizable landing forces; or by small forces (sometimes in 
smaller ships), operating flexibly. For the latter, bases were unimportant; landing 
places were not limited, with any protected beach with water sufficing. The 
 
15
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sanctioned taking of sule in wartime (i.e., privateering) was derivative. Piratical 
warfare did not strike against enemy forces or his agricultural subsistence base, 
but against undefended areas or unprotected littoral communities, and from am-
bush. It might constitute attritional economic war. 
These strategic categories track the distinctions of Thucydides in his Ar-
chaiologia. He emphasizes the piratical character of early seafaring (I 4-5, 3), 
especially regarding the Trojan expedition (I 10, 4-11, 2). His Achaean fleet is 
many massed raiding squadrons, busying themselves before Ilion with forays. In 
this perspective, the pirates of the Odyssey, even Odysseus himself, would be 
conducting merely extended plundering. Thucydides systematically contrasts 
leisteia with thalassocracy. Minos, the first thalassocrat, expels pirates (I 3, 4). 
Corinth, whose naval activity marks Greece’s opening toward the sea, tries to 
free the Aegean from pirates (I 13, 5). To hold leisteia and thalassocracy as op-
posing combat modes implies that pentekontor warfare and trireme warfare were 
alike different modalities. This is Athenian fifth-century conceptualization, as in 
accounts (based on Atthidography) of Kimon’s suppression of the Skyrian pi-
rates
23
, or in the condemnation of immoral and senseless Aiginetan raids (Aigi-
netans whom Herodotus styled thalassokratores)
24
. Thucydides’ disdain for na-
vies ca. 500 is partly owed to their strategic dependence on leisteia. His noting 
their use of pentekontors and ploia makra not only dramatizes a lack of triremes, 
but also actively disparages continued dependence on the tools of ‘small war’
25
.  
Classical thalassocracy must never be confused with modern maritime 
dominance as formulated in the leading nineteenth-century naval strategist, Al-
fred Thayer Mahan (1890). Mahanian concepts are irrelevant for Mediterranean 
galleys, as Guilmartin demonstrated for the sixteenth century
26
. Classical thalas-
socracy was expeditionary and amphibious. This insight partially explains the 
trireme’s retarded predominance. Small trireme forces lacked decisive impact 
because expeditionary warfare demanded mobilizations of scale. 
Triremes in number were expeditionary vessels. Here, Thucydides is re-
vealing concerning archaic hegemonism through insular conquests
27
. Such war-
fare better approximates protocols of land warfare than marauding, because of 
its amphibious nature. Triremes could carry enough hoplites to win a battle
28
; 
 
23
 Plut. Cim. 8, 3-5; Thes. 36, 1; Nep. Cim. 2, 5. Cfr. Thuc. I 98, 2; Ephor. FGrHist 70 F 191, 
6; Diod. XI 60, 2; Paus. I 17, 6. 
24
 Hdt. V 81, 2; 83, 2; VI 87; see also Diod. XI 70, 2; 78, 3-4. Cfr. Ephor. FGrHist 70 F 176.  
25
 Thucydides’ disinclination toward expeditionary warfare that included leisteia is apparent 
in his treatment of Alkidas’ expedition (427) toward Mytilene (III 16, 3; 25, 1; 26, 1; 27, 1-2; 30, 1-
33, 3).  
26
 Guilmartin 2003, 31-55. 
27
 Thuc. I, 4; 9, 4; 13, 6. 
28
 Troop carrying triremes: IG I
3
 21, 10; I
3 
60; Thuc. I 116, 1; VI 25, 2; 43, 1; VIII 25, 1; 62, 
 
Thomas J. Figueira 
504 www.historika.unito.it 
their crews could double as infantry upon arrival (e.g., Thuc. IV 32, 2). A large 
trireme expedition sought landing near an enemy’s asty to interdict food supplies 
and mount a siege. Defenders were forced to mass to expel or block the intrud-
ing fleet, fight a regular engagement, or finally man their walls. This pattern is 
discernible in the Spartan expedition against Polykrates (525: Hdt. III 54-57, 1). 
An earlier, if more obscure, example is a Samian and Megarian battle near 
Perinthos ca. 600 (Plut. Mor. 303E-304C). The trireme expedition was the main-
stay of naval operations throughout the fifth century. Note two non-Attic exam-
ples in Corinthian campaigns against Corcyra of 435 and 433 (I 29, 1-30, 2; 46, 
1-55, 2), although fighting at the Battle of Sybota seemed to Thucydides old-
fashioned, like an infantry engagement (I 49, 1-2).  
Early Attic examples were Miltiades’ Parian campaign (Hdt. VI 132-135, 
1) and an expedition against Aigina (VI 88-93), both early 480s. For Athens, the 
late 490s are the latest moment for the dominance of the trireme. Thucydides’ 
date for the general shift to triremes is imprecise, excepting that the Themis-
toklean ship-building program consummated it (I 14, 3). For Aigina and Athens, 
the process was begun by 500
29
, although both poleis possessed fewer than 100 
triremes ca. 485
30
, perhaps around 70. Circa 519, at Kydonia, Aigina crushed the 
Samian exiles, who had possessed forty triremes in 525 (Hdt. III 44, 1-2; 59, 3,), 
so that Aigina probably had an early advantage. At Athens, the old naukraric 
system, although it did not limit Athens to 48-50 ships, undoubtedly complicated 
modernization
31
. The impetus for acquiring more triremes may be attributed to 
the ‘Heraldless War’ between the two states from 506 (V 81, 1-3; 89, 1-3). The 
abortive Athenian attack on Aigina in 489/8 (VI 88-93) was probably conducted 
with triremes, because lately discovered non-seaworthy Attic ships were re-
placed with twenty Corinthian vessels (VI 89, 2-3), almost certainly reserve tri-
remes (Thuc. I 41, 2). The poorly maintained ships were not the majority of the 
Attic trireme force. The fleet of seventy confronting seventy Aiginetan ships was 
probably exclusively trireme. That the Aiginetans won a later battle indicates a 
comparable trireme force (Hdt. VI 92, 1). Note Miltiades’ seventy ships at Paros 
(VI 132). This reconstruction accords with Athens dispatching twenty triremes 
to aid the Ionians (498)
32
. That commitment was risky while Aigina was hostile, 
and was only viable with a fraction of Athens’ fleet and other triremes in reserve. 
Contemporaneous was the acquisition by Ionian poleis of comparable trireme 
 
2; Xen. Hell. I 1, 36. 
29
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30
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31
 Figueira 1993, 163-167; 2011, 191-193. 
32
 Char. FGrHist 262 F 10, with Hdt. V 99, 1. 
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forces, culminating in the flotillas massed at Lade in 494 (VI 8, 1-2)
33
. 
Expeditionary warfare was pioneered at Corinth. Thucydides’ reference to 
the construction of the first triremes there has already been noted (I 13, 2-3). His 
supplementary observation that the Corinthian shipwright, Ameinokles, built 
four ships, presumably triremes
34
, for the Samians is not only notable for illus-
trating the precocity of Corinthian shipbuilding and attesting this early alliance, 
but also because its recipients were not individuals, but the Samian polis. Thu-
cydides records the first naval battle between Corinth and Corcyra in 680 or 660 
(I 13, 4). Naturally there was earlier sea combat, as Geometric pottery demon-
strates
35
. The eighth-century Lelantine War — Thucydides recognized its im-
portance (I 15, 3) — included sea fighting (Hesiod WD 650-662). By first nau-
machia, Thucydides means a struggle of fleets in battle lines, a structured 
engagement with political consequences, not a melee with mainly personal or 
familial ramifications. These developments are dated to the domination of the 
Bacchiads (Diod. VII 9, 4; 6), an endogamous clan controlling revenues of the 
emporion (Strab. VIII 6, 20). Hence, these first Corinthian triremes were vessels 
whose procurement lay indeterminately between public and private spheres.  
Under the Kypselid tyrants, especially Periander, the Corinthian naval es-
tablishment became more closely knitted into state structures
36
. The Kypselids’ 
sumptuary legislation and confiscations from elite adversaries boosted govern-
mental assets (Hdt. V 92ε, 2; 92η, 1; Heraclid. fr. 20 Dilts; Nic. Dam. FGrHist 
90 F 58, probably Ephoran). Periander developed a trireme force for use on both 
Corinthian and Saronic Gulfs (Nic. Dam. FGrHist 90 F 58). He built the harbor 
at Lekhaion, and constructed the diolkos to move ships across the Isthmus, ena-
bling him to concentrate forces in either gulf
37
. Periander conducted amphibious 
expeditions against Prokles of Epidauros (Hdt III 52, 7; Plut. Mor. 403 C-E), 
Kerinthos in Euboia (Theogn. 891-894)
38
, and Corcyra (Hdt. III 53, 7; Nic. 
Dam. F 59). Early in his Archaiologia, Thucydides indicated that lack of re-
sources, achrematia, not oliganthropia ‘lack of manpower’, limited sea power
39
. 
Unsurprisingly, he emphasized Corinthian wealth through its emporion (I 13, 5). 
Thus, absolute lack of community resources was not everywhere the limitation 
 
33
 Cfr. Wallinga 1987, 49-55, 66-72; 1993, 118-140; 2005, 11-22, for an exaggerated Persian 
role.  
34
 In 724 or 704 depending on variant backward reckoning. The notice derives from genera-
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35
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36
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37
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38
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39
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on building naval power, but inadequacy of the polis’ financial apparatus. Cor-
inth represents a pre-monetary expeditionary trireme navy. Tyrannical leadership 
was sufficiently strong and charismatic to oversee complex projects like the 
building of triremes and naval facilities and the mobilization of manpower.  
Other incidents suggest limitations on Corinthian naval power. Thucydides 
reports their lengthy efforts to amass forces in the 430s, first to challenge the 
Corcyreans besieging Epidamnos, and, second, the protracted preparations for 
direct attack after Leukimne
40
. This involved equipping new ships, mobilizing 
laborers from other crafts and acquiring personnel, some colonial allies and oth-
ers recruited from Attic allies (Thuc. I 35, 3-4; cfr. 31, 1)
41
. That this longer mo-
bilization cycle was inherent in Corinthian military organization is indicated by 
attacks undertaken earlier against local enemies. Amphikrates of Samos attacked 
Aigina ca. 618-13 (Hdt. III 59, 4), and Thrasyboulos of Miletos assaulted Sikyon 
ca. 600 (Front. Strat. III 9, 7). Corinth probably instigated both
42
. If Corinth, 
with its naval tradition, could not launch such attacks, some limitations on its 
mobilization protocols were the cause. Corinth was able to sell Athens twenty 
ships, presumably reserve craft, ca. 489 (Hdt. VI 89, 2-3); thus it did not lack 
ships. 
The practitioners of leisteia and ‘small war’ exhibit another pattern of war-
fare. The first corporate activities of Aigina were raids against its former 
hegemon, Epidauros (Hdt. V 83, 1-2). Depredations against Attica triggered the 
Heraldless War ca. 506 (V 89, 1-3). Interception of an Attic theoric vessel oc-
curred after Marathon (VI 87), prompting further hostilities
43
. Aiginetan leisteia, 
not confined to Peloponnesian squadrons based there, regularly occurred during 
fourth-century conflict between Sparta and Athens (Xen. Hell. V 1, 2; 29; VI 2, 
1), and damage to Athenian interests continued during the conflict with Philip
44
. 
Aigina was well placed for this: its position and town site were ideal for inter-
cepting Saronic Gulf commerce. Aiginetans were also famous traders
45
. Inde-
pendently of Polykrates’ later raiding, archaic Samians practiced leisteia, acting 
collectively or led by individual aristocrats
46
. Amphikrates’ assault on Aigina 
 
40
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41
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42
 Figueira 1993, 23-28; also Salmon 1984, 227. 
43
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45
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46
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was noted above. Samian trade is illustrated by Kolaios’ famous journey to 
Spain (Hdt. IV 152, 2-4), and Samian involvement at Naukratis (II 178, 3). The 
Phokaians penetrated the western Mediterranean in armed pentekontors (III 16, 
1-3)
47
. These commercial voyages probably possessed a belligerent dimension. 
Chios would not sell Phokaian exiles the Oinoussai islands for fear of an empo-
rion there (I 165, 1). Justinus has latrocinium maris as one source of Phokaian 
subsistence (XLIII 3, 5). Phokaian leisteia stands forefront after displacement 
westward following the fall of Ionia (Hdt. I 166, 1-167, 4). Later, the Phokaian 
Dionysios, chosen Ionian admiral at Lade, presumably for experience in combat 
maneuvers, drilled Ionian triremes in advanced tactics (VI 12, 1-4). Escaping the 
Greek defeat, Dionysios became a leistes in Sicily, preying on Carthaginians and 
Etruscans (VI 17). Pentekontors were used by Phokaian and Aiginetan leistai 
and traders, and by Polykrates of Samos. Thus, in late archaic Greece, the pente-
contor was the exemplary vehicle for leisteia or armed trade.  
Nevertheless, the limits of this paradigm are apparent for the Phokaians. 
Thucydides thought their navy noteworthy, citing an early victory over Carthage 
(I 13, 6-14, 1). Upon the Persian advance into Ionia, they resolved to relocate to 
Alalia, their Sardinian colony (I 164, 2-165, 3). Half the Phokaians, regretting 
their decision, returned home, leaving 60 of 120 pentekontors to sail westward. 
In Sardinia, the Phokaian exiles supported themselves by leisteia for five years 
(Hdt. I 166, 1-167, 4). Thereupon they were challenged by 120 Etruscan and 
Carthaginian ships, which they defeated, unfortunately losing 40 ships with 20 
disabled through damage to their rams
48
. The pentekontors’ rams were not ade-
quate for sustained combat, although they presumably had appreciable utility in 
individual duels and for deterrence. Phokaian inability to stand another attack 
caused a retreat eastward (eventuating in the foundation of Elea).  
Triremes with large crews to sustain were usually impractical for trading. 
Without many triremes, the Phokaians could not defend against more numerous 
pentekontors. Contrast the Knidian and Rhodian refugees, who as colonists 
joined with natives to create a polis in the Lipari Islands (ca. 580-576). They not 
only held off Etruscan raiders, but ravaged the Etruscans as raiders themselves 
(Diod. V 9, 5)
49
. The Liparians were advantaged initially by possessing five tri-
remes. Early in their colonization they annihilated four Etruscan squadrons of 
five ships (probably pentekontors) in succession, an iconic victory they celebrat-
ed at Delphi ca. 500 (Paus. X 16, 7; SIG
3
 14; cfr. Diod. V 9, 2-3).  
Thucydides emphasizes achrēmatia as impeding the development of sea 
 
Samian historian (FGrHist 544 F 3); a bout of leisteia by Samian exiles (Plut. Mor. 303D).  
47
 Cfr. Wallinga 1993, 67-83. 
48
 Cfr. Papalas 1997, 260-261. 
49
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(FGrHist 555 T 1, F 1). 
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power (I 11, 1). Tyrants like Periander, with his harbors and diolkos, and 
Polykrates with his ship-shed complex, created exceptional facilities. These lo-
gistical foundations may be contrasted with Athens, where the beach at Phaleron 
was long the main base — as development of the Peiraius only began 493/2 un-
der Themistokles (Thuc. I 93, 2) — and Aigina, where harbors north and south 
of Cape Colonna were used indiscriminately for military and merchant vessels 
into the 480’s, when an advanced military harbor was built
50
. Furthermore, the 
factor that Thucydides derogates, his refused alternative, oliganthropia, should 
alike be recognized as significant, because it still reflects contemporary specula-
tion. Yet, oliganthropia may be determinative only if subtended to achrēmatia. 
Trireme forces had to sustain massive numbers in the context of polis demogra-
phy. By Thucydides’ implication, a seventy-trireme force marked the lower 
range of reputability. Yet it ideally required 14.000 men. Even ca. 550, polis 
treasuries were not very robust. Coinage was still rare; smaller denominations 
rarer still. Scant issues illustrate the rates at which leading mints (Aigina, Athens 
and Corinth) disbursed reserves in communal expenditures that could not entire-
ly supersede bullion or pre-monetary media (e.g., cauldrons or spits). Most 
Greeks, however, were enmeshed in that pre-monetary economy of highly con-
ventionalized exchange among transactors of close social affinity
51
.
 
 
To transcend the financial and demographic limitations of early naval or-
ganization, new state structures had to be erected. Aigina offers indications of 
adaptation in response to these challenges. Problems in manning ships could be 
addressed through slavery. While slaves could not be utilized disproportionately 
as rowers without problems in motivation and compliance, stratified poleis man-
aged these obstacles through manipulating manumission and clientage
52
. Slav-
ery performed a broader role in archaic economies by concentrating labor; 
slaves and freedmen became concentrated within the non-agricultural sector. By 
450, the Aiginetan damos was primarily of servile extraction
53
. Clientage net-
works linked commercial ship captains and sailors from the damos. Moreover, a 
naval treasury supported a larger trireme force
54
, because the sea turtle type of 
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the main mint terminated with the fleet’s suspension in 457/6. Another long-
existing minting authority then assumed exclusive privileges. This mint cele-
brated its terrestrial origin with a land tortoise. Lack of evidence, however, for-
bids proceeding much further in analysis of these masters of leisteia.  
To understand how poleis grappled with organizational challenges in build-
ing trireme navies, capable in both modes of sea fighting, we must explore the 
synthetic administrative approaches of Samos and Athens
55
. Herodotus hailed 
Polykrates as the earliest thalassocrat, referring to ambitions to dominate Ionia 
and the islands (III 122, 2)
56
. These endeavors were realized through conven-
tional expeditionary warfare. Herodotus notes his subjugation of islands and 
mainland cities, adducing Polykrates’ capture of a Lesbian fleet assisting Miletos 
(III 39, 4). Thucydides specifies his insular hegemony (I 13, 6). These operations 
required the entire strength of Samos, which already included a strong trireme 
force
57
.  
Polykrates sent forty triremes to aid Kambyses against Egypt, ships staffed 
by enemies whom he intended to sacrifice (Hdt. III 44, 1-2). Yet Polykrates was 
still strong enough to fight at sea against this squadron when it defied him (III 
45, 1-3). Moreover, Samos deployed sixty triremes at Lade (494: Hdt. VI 8, 2) 
after a Persian massacre ca. 510 (III 147, 1-2; 149). Thus trireme strength under 
Polykrates was at least eighty. Ships sent to Kambyses were captained by elite 
Samians and manned through traditional clientage, making this an attractive 
means for Polykrates to remove enemies and eliminate their followers. Other-
wise, how could Polykrates acquire information to determine whom to suspect 
from the non-elite strata of Samos? These ships’ crews and their leaders did in-
deed exhibit solidarity, cohering through five years of vicissitudes (III 45, 1-46, 
2; 54-59, 4).  
Building on Samian traditions of leisteia, Polykrates also acquired 100 pen-
tekontors and 1.000 archers
58
, and thereby conducted pillaging operations (Hdt. 
III 39, 3). Some were seaborne interceptions; Herodotus would not otherwise be 
comprehensible, observing how Polykrates did not determine his victims’ status, 
but made restitution only to friends (III 39, 4). The samaina was probably de-
veloped for his force of pentekontors. A specialized bireme, with swiftness and 
boar’s head ram, it was broader and decked to carry troops
59
. Previously, pen-
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tekontors mainly carried oarsmen, who doubled as deck fighters or disembarked 
leistai. Samainai could carry Polykrates’ archers and other epibatai on intercep-
tions and raids without sacrificing ramming speed. Some have seen Polykrates’ 
mixed-force structure as betokening transition from the heyday of the pentekon-
tor to that of the trireme
60
, but that hypothesis misses the differentiation in the 
deployment of the two types and Polykrates’ maintenance of a specialist pen-
tekontor force.  
Alternatively, one should view this naval establishment as a tyrannical ini-
tiative blending earlier forms. Circa 600, a Samian fleet of thirty ships was dis-
patched to defend their colony Perinthos from Megara, but its commanders pre-
ferred to conspire with captured Megarians to overthrow the Samian aristocracy, 
the Geomoroi
61
. These ships were probably triremes, because Syloson, an ante-
cessor of Polykrates, launched a coup ca. 590, during the Heraia, with the sup-
port of trireme crews (Polyaen. VI 45). Therefore, in the early 500s, instead of 
private warships, which armed traders or leistai supplied the polis, Samos pos-
sessed a trireme force (like Corinth). By the period of Polykrates, the Samian 
navy involved a cross-section of elites, including aristocrats with ties of xenia at 
Sparta (Hdt. III 47, 1), men acting as ‘trierarchs’ who mobilized clientages.  
Rather than individual aristocrats taking sule with political permission, 
Polykrates appropriated leisteia to serve his hegemonic goals. These were intim-
idation and the institution of a regime of quasi-taxation through confiscation, ac-
companied by selective redistribution. Hence the apparatus of leisteia could 
achieve unprecedented scale (100 pentekontors), acquire specialized equipment 
(samainai), and enlist professionals (Samian toxotai and epikouroi misthotai). 
The ‘thalassocracy’ of Polykrates was vitalized by dual military establishments: 
a ‘grand warfare’ mechanism with triremes and hoplites, subsidized by the polis, 
and a ‘small war’ apparatus of ‘special forces’, supported through resources gar-
nered from regional hegemony. When the expeditionary force for Kambyses de-
fected, Polykrates held citizen women and children hostage in the ship-sheds, 
which his mercenaries could burn (Hdt. III 45, 4). While just strong enough to 
repel the Spartans, Polykrates was fatally left vulnerable to blandishments from 
the satrap of Sardis (III 122, 1-125, 4). 
The Athenian naukraric order reveals another synthetic system
62
. Naukra-
roi derived from the ship-owning families of coastal Attica — Kolias is the only 
identified naukraria
63
 — who originally supplied private ships. Naukraroi later 
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commanded ships on public service, somewhat like classical trierarchs (Poll. 
VIII 108), but had become officials
64
 over whom higher magistrates, prytanies, 
stood. Herodotus believed the prytanies performed important administrative 
functions during the Kylonian coup (V 71, 2). The naukraric system addressed 
several glaring needs of archaic naval organization.  
First, it harnessed the resources of the whole polis to supplement assets of-
fered by the maritime sector in its local contexts. Ideally, fleets needed to use 
coins because their hierarchy of values permitted segmented, spaced disbursals. 
The Athenaion Politeia cites archaic laws on naukraroi levying funds and 
spending from the naukraric treasury, and notes their connection with eisphorai 
and dapanai
65
. Regarding their role in keeping property registers, testimonia 
compare naukraroi to later demarchs
66
. Thus, the naukraries were compared to 
later trierarchic symmories, and some mechanism for assignment of responsibil-
ity existed because one could assert a challenge to assignment (Clid. FGrHist 
323 F 8; Phot. ναυκραρία). Secondly, the naukraric system did not surrender 
the advantages of ‘small war’. The late discovery by the Athenians of insuffi-
cient seaworthy ships to face Aigina shows that naukraric ships were based in 
naukraric centers. Each naukraria kept ready a ship and two horsemen, who 
could raise the alarm for quick action (Poll. VIII, 108). Third, naukrariai were 
incorporated into the tribal system, as sub-divisions of first the Ionian tribes and 
then Kleisthenic tribes
67
. Thus the naukraries exploited a larger manpower res-
ervoir than available from the followings of the naukraroi or the naukraric dis-
tricts. Difficulties in mobilizing oarsmen still slowed emergence of a large tri-
reme fleet, but the naukraric system was progress toward their resolution.  
Athens was an unusually large polis whose military could interweave dis-
parate social components, in this case fusing a maritime segment which engaged 
in local trade, coastal transport, and, possibly, leisteia with a large, basically 
agrarian economy. Athenian experience of tyranny embodied the centralization 
of administrative functions typifying the Corinthian state. Fortunately for Ath-
ens, however, the Peisistratids did not break so violently with traditions as dy-
nastic government elsewhere, and an aristocratic backlash could not stifle popu-
list impulses. Also, Sparta lay too distant to shift the political balance toward 
reaction and oligarchy. Hence, continuous institutional adaptation progressed 
toward monetization, a flexible, market-based economy, and demographic 
growth. Elsewhere, I offered a hypothesis for the desuetude of the naukrariai in 
their failing to meet the demands of the Aiginetan war in the 480s, and adduced 
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as evidence an ostrakon denouncing the strategos Xanthippos (Agora 25, 
#1065)
68
. Eventually, Athens reformulated its navy yet again through creating 
the trierarchy and instituting the authority of the Boule. Fifth-century naval war-
fare is largely the story of the Athenian fleet and the elaborate mechanisms for 
its upkeep, subsidization, and manning, which other poleis had to imitate in 
grappling with the ramifications of Attic imperialism
69
. Thus, as we explore ar-
chaic maritime warfare, we come not only to comprehend the foundations of At-
tic power, but also to appreciate better its extraordinary accomplishments. 
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Abstract 
 
An enigma in Thucydides’ description of the rise of Greek naval power in his Archaio-
logia is his notice on the late eighth-century origination of the trireme, which may be 
coupled with his further specification that large trireme navies did not emerge until the 
late archaic period. This paper stands strongly against the tendency to reject the implica-
tions of Thucydides’ treatment, although it also explains how Atthidography in the per-
son of Kleidemos confronted the challenge of interpreting Thucydides. It argues that the 
emergence of the large trireme navy required mastering administrative problems, and not 
merely solving engineering challenges. Resources had to be amassed for the creation and 
maintenance of trireme forces in early monetizing economies. Manpower had to be mo-
bilized in a manner conforming to prevailing socio-political structures. In this context, 
the evidence on the appearance of triremes in archaic navies is presented. I propose that 
leisteia ‘brigandage’ was pervasive in archaic Greece. This ‘small war’ was particularly 
suited to the use of pentekontors by commercial poleis such as Aigina, Phokaia, and Sa-
mos. Corinth, however, is the best example of an early trireme navy, and its naval ad-
ministration became highly developed under the Kypselid tyrants. This force structure 
accommodated commerce that was more passive, intermediated, and colonial, but did 
not lend itself to rapid mobilization. In the late archaic period, the monetization of naval 
warfare becomes apparent, and slavery plays a role in addressing manpower needs. 
Moreover, synthetic regimes of naval organization appear on Samos under Polykrates 
and at Athens in the naukraric system — that balance or blend leisteia and trireme war-
fare. The resolution of the challenges of the trireme navy is an aspect of the achievement 
of the more integrated classical polis, which culminated in the breakthrough of the naval 
arche of Athens. 
 
